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ADRIFT WITHOUT A PADDLE: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF
THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PRESERVATION AcT

ROBERT E. BAUTE, JR.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Covering over 64,000 square miles from New York to Virginia,1
the Chesapeake Bay ("Bay") is the country's largest and most biologically
diverse estuary. 2 In addition, the Bay is one of Virginia's most valuable
natural resources. 3 It has played a major role in the development of
Virginia's culture and traditions4 as well as some of the state's major
5
industries, including tourism, trade, shipbuilding, and fishing.
Unfortunately, as the population in the Bay region has risen, so too has the
level of pollution and the demands on the Bay's finite resources.6 As a
result, excess sediment and nutrients 7 are finding their way into the Bay
and are endangering its water quality.
Virginia has attempted to address the Bay's ecological
deterioration in numerous ways. On the interstate level, Virginia works in
* Mr. Baute received his B.A. from Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in
1994, and expects to receive his M.P.P. from the College of William and Mary and his
J.D. from William and Mary School of Law in May 2002.
I Marshall Groom, The Chesapeake Bay PreservationAct: A Status Report, 2 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 217, 220 (1993).

"An estuary is a body of water, open at one end to

the ocean, in which salt water from the ocean mixes with freshwater draining from land.
In the case of the Chesapeake Bay, it's open near Norfolk in southeastern Virginia to the

Atlantic Ocean."

CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, ABOUT THE CHESAPEAKE BAY-BAY
FAQ (Aug. 10, 1999), at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/bayfaq.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2001) [hereinafter Bay FAQ].
2 See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE 2000 BAY AGREEMENT, at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/agreement.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter CBA 2000].
3 LYNDA L. BUTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON, VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COASTAL
LAW 47

1988).
See CBA 2000, supra note 2.
5 Harry R. Hughes & Thomas W. Burke, Jr., The Cleanup of the ChesapeakeBay: A Test
o PoliticalWill, 11 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 30 (1996).
BAY FAQ, supra note 1.
7 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM,

CHESAPEAKE BAY ECOSYSTEM-A

THREATENED

RESOURCE, at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/ecointlc.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001)
[hereinafter Bay Ecosystem].
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cooperation with Maryland, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, the
Chesapeake Bay Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), as a member of the Chesapeake Bay Program ("Program").s
This program helps to coordinate the individual efforts of the respective
members and sets goals for the restoration and protection of the Bay. 9 The
Program came about as a result of historic agreements signed in 1983 and
1987.10 In order to meet the goals set by the 1987 Chesapeake Bay
Agreement ("CBA"), in 1988 Virginia enacted the Chesapeake Bay
Preservation Act ("CBPA"). " The CBPA is the centerpiece of Virginia's
Bay policy. Its goal is to improve water quality in the Bay and its
tributaries through the use of wise resource management practices.12 It is
based on the idea that the use and development of land can continue as
long as13appropriate steps are taken to mitigate the impact on water
quality.
The philosophy behind the CBPA is that local governments are in
a better position to effectively and pragmatically reduce pollution of the
Bay from adjacent lands. 14 Instead of creating a large regulatory agency
and empowering it to create and enforce regulations protecting the Bay,
the Virginia General Assembly created a small agency (Chesapeake Bay
Local Assistance Department ("CBLAD")) and Board; and empowered
localities to implement pollution reductions measures in accordance with
standards and criteria provided by CBLAD.15 The CBPA created a unique
partnership between the state government and the localities, in which the
localities are expected to take the lead not only in making
land use6
decisions but also in the enforcement of those decisions.'
Today, twelve years after the CBPA was originally enacted, a
number of flaws have become apparent. Chief among them is that the
Board and CBLAD do not have the necessary funding, tools, or authority
to ensure that localities are fully and effectively implementing the law.
This Note analyzes the law itself, discusses the important issues
8 CBA 2000, supra note

2.

99Id.
11VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100-16 (Michie 1950 & Cum.
Supp. 2000).
12 CHESAPEAKE BAY LOCAL ASSISTANCE DEP'T, ABOUT CBLAD AND VIRGINIA'S BAY

ACT PROGRAM, at http://www.cblad.st ate.va.us/about.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
13 id.
14See id.
15

See id.
id.

16 See
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surrounding its implementation, and makes recommendations for how the
Act could be improved.
II.

THE CHESAPEAKE BAY

A.

A NaturalResource

There is little debate about the fact that the Bay is a tremendous
natural resource.' 7 In 1997 alone it was estimated that the dockside value
of the Bay's commercial shellfish and finfish harvests was close to $196
million.'8 The Bay is also a major commercial waterway, with two key
North American ports.' 9 The Hampton Roads Complex (i.e., Portsmouth,
Norfolk, Hampton, and Newport News) at the mouth of the bay is second
nationally in metric tons of exports. 20 Further north, the port of Baltimore
is ranked eleventh in volume of exports in foreign trade.2 In total,
Baltimore and Hampton Roads handled seventy million tons of both
imports and exports in 1997.22 Another key Bay-related industry is
shipbuilding, with one of the nation's largest remaining builders of
commercial and naval vessels located in Newport News.23
B.

An Ecosystem

As a large estuary, the Bay is also a tremendously important
ecosystem. Estuaries contain nature's most productive habitats. 24 Many
important species of fish, including white and yellow perch, striped bass,
herring, and shad, use the Bay's tidal freshwater tributaries as spawning
grounds and nurseries.25 Others, such as the bluefish, weakfish, Atlantic
Croaker, menhaden, summer flounder, and spot, use the Bay as a feeding
ground during the warmer months. 26 Also, many migratory birds and
17 CBA 2000, supra note
2.

18 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM,

CHESAPEAKE BAY-AN

IMPORTANT RESOURCE, at

http://www.chesapeakebay.net/ecointlb.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
19 Jd.

20Id.
21 Id.
22

23

Id.
Id.

See Groom, supra note 1, at 217.
25 BAY ECOSYSTEM, supra note 7.
26 _
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waterfowl use the Bay as a stopover. 27 These species include tundra
swans, Canadian geese, canvasback ducks, pintail ducks, scoter ducks,
eider ducks, and ruddy ducks.28 Important permanent residents of the Bay
include the Bald Eagle and the Osprey. 29 30In total, the Bay is a host to over
3,600 species of plants, fish, and animals.
III.

THE HEALTH OF THE BAY

With the Bay playing such an important role in the histories,
cultures, and economies of Virginia and the other states in the Chesapeake
Bay watershed, 3' it is impossible to overstate the importance of keeping it
healthy and vibrant. However, the most recent State of the Bay report
from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation ("CBF") 32 scored the Bay's health
at 28 out of a possible 100. 33

This represented no change from the

previous year.34 CBF acknowledges that a 100-a pristine bay-is
unattainable because of the permanent development of the watershed, but
believes the Bay could eventually reach about 70.35
The CBF estimates the Bay's score bottomed out in the early
36
It was around that
1980s when it would have likely been about a 23.
Id.
Id.
29 Id.
27

28

30 BAY FAQ, supra note 1.
31 Watersheds are defined as follows:

A watershed is a region of land that is crisscrossed by smaller
waterways that drain into a larger body of water. For example,
thousands of creeks, streams and rivers in Pennsylvania ultimately
drain into the Susquehanna River. The land these streams and rivers
drain is considered Susquehanna River watershed or basin. On a larger
scale, the 64,000 square miles of land drained by hundreds of thousands
of rivers, creeks and streams crisscrossing the Bay region comprises the
Chesapeake Bay watershed or basin.
Id.

The CBF is a private sector organization dedicated to defending and restoring the
Chesapeake Bay. CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, ABOUT CBF, at http://www.savethe
baycbf.org/about cbf/what we do.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
32

Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay, Declines Offset Gains; CBF Index Same as 1999,
BAY J. (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.bayjournal.com/00-10/cbf.htm (last visited

Dec. 1, 2001).
34 See id.
35id.
36

Id.
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time that people really started to focus attention on the Bay's deteriorating
health. In 1983, the EPA completed a 7-year study, which found:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Increased occurrence of algae blooms;
Significant decrease in submerged aquatic
vegetation;
Significant decrease in the supply and reproduction
of various varieties of shellfish;
Startlingly high levels of nitrogen and phosphorus
in the Bay;
Dissolved oxygen levels had decreased substantially
in certain areas; and
High levels of toxic compounds on. the Bay's
bottom near the ports of Baltimore and Norfolk.

Increased algae growth in the water represents a major problem
striking at the heart of the Bay's ecological structure. 38 It suffocates other
marine life by using up precious oxygen in the water. 39 It also blocks
sunlight that is necessary for the growth of bottom grasses-grasses that
40
provide food for waterfowl and a habitat for spawning fish and shellfish.
The major cause of increased algae growth is excess nutrients in
the water in which the algae feed. 41 These nutrients are emitted by
"nonpoint" source pollution. Nonpoint source pollution is pollution that
cannot be traced to a pipe or any single identifiable point but is instead
contained in natural drainage that comes from farms, lawns, parking lots,
sewage treatment plants, etc. 43 More than half the pollution in the Bay
comes from nonpoint sources."
Due in part to the increased pollution, production of many types of
fish and shellfish has greatly decreased. a A startling example of this is
the oyster harvest. From the 1950s through 1970s the average annual
37 Paul D. Barker, Jr., Note, The Chesapeake Bay PreservationAct: The Problem with

State Land Regulation of InterstateResources, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 735 (1990).
38 See Groom, supra note 1, at 218.
39 Id.
40

Id.

41Id.
42

Id.

43 Id.
44 See Groom, supra note 1, at 218
45 See BAY ECOSYSTEM, supra note 7.
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oyster catch was about twenty five million pounds
per year.46 Since then,
47
however, the catch has declined dramatically.
IV.

CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT

The first real step in addressing these problems came in 1983 when
Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and the EPA
signed the first CBA, a short agreement to coordinate efforts to address the
problems outlined in the EPA study.48 In 1987, a more expansive
agreement was signed, setting concrete goals and addressing the Bay's
problems from a number of perspectives, including water quality, animal
and plant life, the impact of growth and development around the Bay,
public access to the Bay, and the public's education on issues relating to
the Bay.49 A key goal of this agreement was to "reduce and control point
and nonpoint sources of pollution to attain the water
quality condition
50
necessary to support the living resources of the Bay."
V.

THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PRESERVATION ACT

While the CBA provided broad outline for addressing the Bay's
specific problems, each of the states was left with the responsibility of
devising their own detailed strategies and structures for the
implementation of the agreement. In 1988, Virginia stepped up to the
plate by enacting the CBPA.5" The CBPA centers upon improving land
use management and reducing nonpoint source pollution through a
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 See Barker, supra note 37, at 745.
49
50

Id. at 747-48.
Id. at 748 (quoting Chesapeake Bay Agreement of the Chesapeake Exec. Council

(Dec. 15, 1987) (available from the Council on the Environment, Richmond, Virginia)).
The 1987 Agreement set specific goals for the year 2000. Id. With regard to nutrients,
the Agreement called for reducing levels in the Bay by 40%. Id. This required reducing
annual phosphorus emissions by 10 million lbs. and reducing annual nitrogen emissions
by 74 million lbs. Id. Recent studies indicate that the Bay partners have fallen short of
their phosphorus and nitrogen goals by 1.5 million lbs. and 24 million lbs. respectively.
See Karl Blankenship, Bay Program FallingShort of 40% Goal to Cut Nutrients, BAY J.
(Oct. 2000), at http://www.bayjournal.com/00-10/goal.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
However, the Program members signed a new Chesapeake Bay Agreement in 2000,
revising their goals and strategies for the protection and restoration of the Bay. See CBA
2000, supra note 2.
51 Groom, supra note 1, at 218.
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partnership program between the state and the eighty-nine localities in the
Tidewater area (essentially everything east of Interstate 95).52
State Level Structure

A.

At the state level, the CBLAD administers the CBPA. 53 The Board
is made up of nine citizens, appointed by the Governor, representing
different parts of the Tidewater, as well as various interests including
business, agriculture, land development, local government, and
environmental management. 54 The Board's responsibilities include:
1. Promulgating and updating regulations that establish
criteria for local programs;
2. Providing technical and financial assistance to local
governments;
3. Providing technical assistance and advice to regional
and state agencies on land use and water quality
protection; and
4. Ensuring that local comprehensive plans and zoning
ordinances are in compliance with the
and subdivision
55
regulations.
The Board is staffed and supported by CBLAD, which consists of an
Executive Director and three divisions (i.e., Administration, Engineering,
of liaisons available to assist
and Planning).56 CBLAD also has a number
57
localities with implementation issues.
Philosophy Behind the Act: Empower Local Governments

B.

The CBPA was written with the goal of putting decision-making
power into the hands of local level officials. The language of the statute
states that:
52

Id. at 219.

53

Id.

54 Chesapeake Bay

Local Assistance Dep't Website, at http://www.cblad.state.va.u

s/pres/cbpaover/cbpaover-files/frame.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter CBLAD
Website].
55 Id.
56

Id.

57

Id.
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Local governments have the initiative for planning and for
implementing the provisions of this chapter, and the
commonwealth shall act primarily in a supportive role by
providing oversight for local governmental programs, by
establishing criteria as required by this chapter, and by
providing those resources necessar7 to carry out and
enforce the provisions of this chapter. 8
Legislators envisioned localities using their zoning and permit
powers to effectively protect sensitive areas and reduce nonpoint source
pollution while retaining the flexibility to tailor the initiative to the
specific circumstances and needs that exist in their community. Also,
legislators understood that a large state level body regulating land-use,
much of which occurs on private property, would likely engender a great
deal of resentment and hostility.5 9 Placing enforcement at the local level
allows citizens to gain a better understanding of the issue and the stakes,
helping to alleviate some fears and doubts. This philosophy is actually
supported, at least in principal, by environmental groups such as the CBF.
In a CBF fact sheet entitled "Debunking Sprawl Myths: What We Really
Want in Our Communities," a subsection entitled "Myth 7: Managing
Growth Means That the State Will Take Over Local Powers" states that
"[1]ocal governments must retain primary authority for local land-use
decisions. They know their communities and are most closely connected
to the people whose lives they impact .... State growth objectives and
requirements should serve as a guide for local plans." 60
C.

CBPA: A Three-PhasePlan

1.

Phase One

The first phase of the CBPA was the delineation of Chesapeake
Bay Preservation Areas and the adoption of performance criteria for the
58VA.CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100(B) (Michie 1950 &
Gum. Supp. 2000).

Michael Clower, Executive Director of the Chesapeake Bay
Local Assistance
Department, recently encapsulated his Agency's position this way, "We're a land-use
program. And in Virginia, that's just not a popular thing." Scott Harper, Portsmouth
Ignores Rules on Environmental Studies, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Sept. 11,
2000, at B1,availableat 2000 WL 23683684.
60
59

CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUND., DEBUNKING SPRAWL MYTHS: WHAT WE REALLY WANT
IN
OUR COMMUNITIES, at http://www.savethebay.cbf.org/resources/facts/debunkingspra

wl.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
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lands within the preservation areas. 61 CBPAs are lands "which, if
improperly developed, may result in substantial damage to water quality
of the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries." 62 They can be divided into two
categories: Resource Protection Areas ("RPAs") and Resource
Management Areas ("RMAs").63
RPAs are made up of "tidal wetlands, non-tidal wetlands
connected by surface flow and contiguous to tidal wetlands or tributary
streams, tidal shores, other lands, [and] a buffer of not less than 100 feet in
width landward of these features and along both sides of any tributary
stream. '64 The purpose of the buffer is to mitigate the effects of human
activities and runoff on sensitive areas in the watershed.65 Within RPAs
there are strict regulations on land-use practices. CBLAD believes that
these buffers achieve a 75% reduction in the sediments that enter the Bay
Z
from a particular protected area as well as 40% reduction in nutrients.
The regulations allow for the development within the buffer if it is redevelopment or if it is for a water dependent use. 67 There are also a
number of exemptions from RPA regulations, including water wells;
boardwalks, trails, and pathways used for passive recreation; and historic
preservation or archaeological activities, as well as public roads, utilities,
and railroads. Finally, the regulations allow for modifications to the
requirements on pre-1989 lots where enforcing the buffer would mean a
68
loss of buildable land. Modifications can also be sought for agricultural
land to come within fifty feet if a best management practice ("BMP") is
complete or even within twenty-five feet on agricultural land that is
implementing a Conservation Plan. 69 These modifications must be in the

See Groom, supra note 1,at 220.
62 Id. (quoting Southeastern Va. Planning Dist. Comm'n, A Guide to Virginia's
Chesapeake Bay PreservationAct, ENVTL. NEWS (special ed. Mar. 1990)).

61

63 CBLAD Website, supra note 54.

64 See id. "Lands at or near the shoreline that have an intrinsic water quality value." Id.
65 See id.
66

See id.

67See id. Water dependent uses include ports, intake and outtake structures for power

plants and other plants, marinas and other boat docking structures, beaches, and fisheries.
See id.
68 See id.

69 See CBLAD Website, supra note 54.

BMPs are practices, or combinations of

practices, that are determined by the state or area wide planning agency to be the most
effective, practicable means of preventing or producing the amount of pollution generated

by nonpoint sources to a level compatible with water quality goals. Id.
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form of the minimum necessary to provide relief.7° RMAs are made up of
"floodplains, highly erodible soils (including steep slopes), highly
permeable soils, non-tidal wetlands not included in RPAs, [and] other
71
lands."
The performance criteria set out by the Board in the regulations
were:
1. No more land shall be disturbed than is necessary to
provide for the desired use or development.
2. Indigenous vegetation shall be preserved to the
maximum extent possible.
3. Localities must ensure Best Management Practice
(BMP) maintenance through agreements with the owner
or developer.
4. All development exceeding 2,500 square feet shall be
accomplished through a plan of development process.
5. Land development shall minimize impervious cover.
6. Any land disturbing activity that exceeds 2,500 square
feet (including construction of single-family homes &
septic tanks and drainfields) shall comply with the local
erosion and sediment control ordinance.
7. On-site sewage treatment systems not requiring a
VPDES permit shall: a) be pumped out at least once
every 5 years and b) provide a reserve sewage disposal
site.
8. Stormwater Management:
a. For development and re-development currently
served by BMPs, post-development nonpoint
source pollution runoff load shall not exceed predevelopment load.
b. For redevelopment, pre-developed loads must be
reduced by 10%.
9. Agricultural lands shall have a soil and water quality
conservation plan.
10. Silvicultural activities are exempt provided they adhere
to the water quality protection procedures prescribed by
the Department of Forestry.
70See id.

See id. CBLAD describes these lands as "[l]ands that if improperly used or developed
have potential for causing water quality degradation or for diminishing the functional
value of the RPA." Id.
71
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11. Local governments shall require evidence of all
wetlands permits required by law
prior to authorizing
72
activity.
on-site
other
grading or
2.

Phase Two

The second phase of the CBPA plan required local governments to
construct or revise a comprehensive plan incorporating protection of
CBPAs and water quality in general.73 These plans had to address five
particular policy areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Physical constraints to development;
Protection of potable water supply;
Shoreline and streambank erosion;
Public and private
access to waterfront areas; and
74
Redevelopment.

Upon the completion of Phase Two, the Board reviewed the localities'
plans to ensure that it properly addressed the Board's performance criteria
and policy recommendations.
3.

Phase Three

The third and final phase requires the localities to incorporate
specific water quality protection measures into their comprehensive plan
and into their zoning and subdivision ordinances. 75 This serves the
purpose of ensuring that CBPA considerations are an essential and
unavoidable part of every zoning or development decision. In summary,
at the end of the third phase each local program must include seven
elements: (1) a map delineating preservation act areas; (2) performance
criteria for land use and development in preservation areas; (3) a
comprehensive plan incorporating protection of preservation areas and
water quality; (4) a zoning ordinance that includes measures to protect
water quality; (5) a subdivision ordinance that includes measures to
protect water quality; (6) an erosion and sediment control ordinance

72

Id.

Groom, supra note 1, at 222.
See CBLAD Website, supra note 54.
75 See Groom, supra note 1, at 223.
73See
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consistent with provisions in the regulations; and 76(7) a plan of
development review processes that protects water quality.
D.

State Plays Limited Role

With almost all of the localities now having completed phase two
and the tools of implementation now in the hands of the localities, the role
of the Boards and of CBLAD as envisioned in the CBPA is essentially to
provide oversight and guidance to the localities so that their programs can
continually become more modem, effective, and efficient. CBLAD
accomplishes this task in three different ways. First, it is continually
updating the regulations that establish the criteria for the Bay Act
programs. This constant updating process allows CBLAD to incorporate
new information gained through scientific investigation as lessons learned
from its experiences, those of localities in the Commonwealth, and those
of other members of the Chesapeake Bay Program. Second, CBLAD
provides technical and financial assistance to the local governments.77
This assistance varies from CBLAD personnel that assist local
governments in the process of creating and updating comprehensive plans
to grants that go to localities or planning districts to help with
implementation.
Third, CBLAD ensures that local government
comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, and subdivision ordinances
remain in compliance with the CBPA regulations.
CBLAD's most important oversight authority pertains to
enforcement. It is CBLAD's responsibility to make sure that the localities
are acting in "continual" accordance with their approved comprehensive
plans and enforcing the related ordinances. 79 This is a very serious task.
If the locality refuses to comply, CBLAD can ask the Attorney General to
sue the locality.80 This authority has proven more useful as a threat than
as an actual weapon. It has been very effective in persuading localities to
amend their ordinances or comprehensive plans in order to bring them into
compliance with the Board's regulations. 8
76 See id.
77See

Groom, supra note 1, at 224.
Clower, Address at the Save the Bay Breakfast (Nov. 19, 2000).

78 See Michael

CBLAD's budget for such assistance at one time was as high as $1.5 million annually but
is now at $500,000. See id.
79See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2103(10) (Michie 1950 & Cum. Supp.
2000).
80
d. § 10.1-2104.
81 Telephone Interview with Shawn Smith, Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance
Department (Oct. 5, 2000).
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CBLAD v. Board of Supervisors of Charles City County

E.

Only once has the Board actually gone to court in order to force a
locality to comply with the Act. In 1992, the Board of Supervisors of
Charles City County adopted a program that the Board found to be
inconsistent with the Act and regulations.82 After subsequent amendments
failed to bring the County into compliance, on June 10, 1993, the Attorney
General filed a complaint on behalf of the Board seeking to compel
compliance. 83 In particular, the Board wanted the County to change a
twenty-five foot resource management area that it believed did not provide
sufficient water quality protection. 4 The Circuit Court of the County of
Charles City granted the Board's motion for a preliminary injunction on
June 18, 1993 and ordered the County to comply.85 The County adopted a
new ordinance on October 26, 1993, only to again have it found to be
inconsistent with the Act and regulations. 86 The Board-then amended its
original Bill of Complaint seeking to have the Court enjoin the County to
87 The
adopt a program in compliance with the Act and regulations.,
County subsequently agreed to adopt a program of compliance with the
Act and regulations. 8 The court then issued a consent decree ordering the
County to submit its program, including the agreed upon amendments, to
the Board for review and approval.8 9 The County complied with this order
and the case was stricken. 9
VI.

BREAKDOWNS IN THE SYSTEM

A.

Portsmouth: A Wake-Up Call

82 Letter from Michael D. Clower, Executive Director, Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance

Department, to Dennis H. Treacy, Director, Virginia Department of Environmental
Quality (June 14, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Clower Letter].

See id.

84 See Lorraine Blackwell, Bay Ordinance Fight Settled Out of Court: Charles City,
Group Both Claim Victory, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 14, 1994, at B6, available

at 1994 WL 7114589.
85 See Clower Letter, supra note 82.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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It was recently discovered that for years Portsmouth has been
neither enforcing the buffer requirement, nor requiring environment and
water quality assessments mandated by the CBPA. 91 This only came to
light when a citizen advocacy group called "Save Our Buffers," which
formed to fight the proposed building of 102 condominiums within fifty
feet of the Elizabeth River, requested to see environmental impact studies
through the Freedom of Information Act, and were told that the documents
did not exist. 92 The lapses allowed at least four waterfront subdivisions to
93
be built without proper review.
On September 18, 2000, the Board voted to sue Portsmouth for
violating the CBPA. 94 However, as of yet, the Attorney General has not
filed a suit. 95 The likely reason for that is the threat of suit helped to
motivate Portsmouth to take the legislation more seriously, and the day
after the suit was filed Portsmouth's Deputy City Attorney said that they
would be sending out a revised plan for CBLAD's review as soon as
possible. 96 Since that date CBLAD has conducted an audit of
Portsmouth's files and is currently in negotiations to bring about
97
compliance.
This unfortunate series of events highlights many of the important
problems facing the CBPA. The city's complete (and seemingly
intentional) failure to implement the rules and CBLAD's total lack of
awareness both hint at major problems which may be undermining the
CBPA and could slow Virginia's progress toward the day when the Bay
reaches the 70 health rating the CBF thinks is achievable.
B.

Localities Oppose the CBPA

See Scott Harper, Portsmouth Ignores Rules on Environmental Studies, VIRGINIANPILOT & LEDGER STAR, Sept. 11, 2000, at BI, availableat 2000 WL 23683684.
92 See id.
See id.
9See id
See id.
96 Scott Harper, Panel Votes to Sue Portsmouth: State Board Says City
Has Ignored
ChesapeakeBay PreservationAct, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Sept. 19, 1999, at
BI, availableat 2000 WL 23684503.
97 Telephone Interview with Michael Clower, Executive Director,
Chesapeake Bay Local
Assistance Department (Mar. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Clower Interview].
91
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When the Act passed it generated a great deal of confusion and
fear in the effected communities." There was an outcry from many that it
would kill development and leave countless landowners with land that
could not be built on, causing serious financial losses. 99 While some of
the more dire predictions have not been realized, there is still a great deal
of bitterness towards the Act, some of it coming from the local
enforcement officials. These officials feel that the CBPA is more of a
hindrance than a tool. 100 A common complaint is that the CBPA limits the
options they have in dealing with environmental issues in their
communities, leaving little room for allowing or encouraging creative
mitigation measures that might.' 0 ' For example, when existing property
developed years ago becomes vacant due to competitive issues, site, etc.,
localities have difficulty finding new tenants or buyers because any
02
required changes to the site making it viable are often prohibitive.'
Henrico County has addressed this problem in some situations with a
program that grants certain exemptions to developers in exchanger for
payment into a fund used for environmental rehabilitation of local rivers
and streams. 10 3 Planners in Henrico claim that this has been extremely
successful because-it allows them to concentrate funds towards effective
river cleanup in the most polluted waterways in the county. 0 4 However,
this option is not available in many situations because of the Board's
regulations.' 5 Allowing equally beneficial, alternative means of
compliance might be more efficient.
There is a downside to granting this kind of flexibility to the
localities. In general, localities have little expertise or no environmental
mitigation and planning, and few resources with which to obtain help.
CBLAD would have to be extremely vigilant in its oversight of the
localities to make sure that proper steps were being taken to mitigate
damages. Under such a system CBLAD would have to oversee eighty98 See Deborah Kelly, New Bay Preservation Law Will Limit Developable Land,
RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 1990, at Al, available at 1990 WL 4541431;

Angela Rucker, Bay Act Confusion Remains: Counties Take Steps to Comply with Law,
RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Oct. 31, 1990, availableat 1990 WL 4750115.
99 See id.
100 Telephone Interview with Harvey Hinson, City Planner, Henrico County, Virginia
(Oct. 5, 2000) [hereinafter Hinson Interview].
101 See id.
102 See

id.

103 See id.

See id.
105 See id.
104
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four different standards attempting to ensure that no localities were
allowing persons or businesses to build within the 100-foot buffer without
obtaining proper compensation (whether it be money, mitigation, or a
BMP). Such a task would likely overtax CBLAD already stretched
resources, at least as it is currently constituted.
C.

What's Truly Goodfor the Environment?

Like Portsmouth, Norfolk has an ordinance allowing development
within fifty feet of the water if certain mitigation steps are taken.10 6 Lee
Rosenberg, Norfolk's Environmental Services Director, said this type of
flexible policy is useful in urban areas because it can be used to encourage
cluster development, thereby reducing sprawl. 0 7 "We think we're helping
the environment by encouraging tighter development in our urban
watersheds."' 0 8 He believes the original Act rightly included flexibility
for urban localities and is concerned that regulators are growing more
insistent that localities keep a 100-foot buffer. 1i9
Supporters of the 100-foot buffer point out that the distance did not
come about by accident but was arrived at by intensive scientific research
in the matter. CBLAD contends that the amount of pollutants filtered out
using a 100-foot buffer far exceeds the amount filtered by a 50-foot buffer
and this difference cannot be effectively remedied through the use of
BMPs and other mitigation measures, especially when those exceptions
are being granted on a broad scale. 1 0 CBLAD claims that the 100-foot
buffer requirement is not arbitrary, but was chosen based on the results of
intensive scientific research in the matter. However, many local planners
and commissioners believe that other mitigation methods such as BMPs or
river rehabilitation programs can be equally effective in combating runoff.
This disagreement highlights a very basic and difficult problem.
Though there may be broad agreement that runoff is polluting the bay,
there seems to be no consensus among scientists or planners on how best
to address the problem. Although all of the relevant players point to
scientific evidence studies to support their positions, one must ask whether
they arrived at these positions because of the scientific evidence, or if they
simply looked for evidence to support positions they were already tied to
106

Harper,supra note 91.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See

Clower, supra note 78.
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for unrelated reasons. It is certainly an interesting coincidence that state
level regulators point to studies supporting the easily enforceable buffer
solution, while local level administrators point to studies supporting the
use of more flexible methods such as BMPs.
D.

Exceptions Becoming the Rule

The Portsmouth case was shocking insofar as the City's actions
evidenced a complete and utter disregard for the laws and regulations of
the CBPA. While this type of willful negligence may be rare, it is
becoming abundantly clear that the wholesale granting of buffer
exceptions is becoming a standard practice in some localities.
VIi.

CBLAs NOT EQUIPPED
REGULATIONS

TO ENFORCE

COMPLIANCE

WITH

ITS

The CBPA and regulations were recently incorporated into the
Virginia Coastal Resources Management Program as one of the Program's
enforceable policies.'' This incorporation required that the Program meet
five federal consistency provisions pursuant to the Coastal Zone
Management Act.112 The fifth and last of these provisions requires that
the "state has the ability to assure local compliance with its program once
approved."' 1 3 In a letter to the Director of the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality ("DEQ"), Dennis H. Treacy, CBLAD Executive
Director Michael Clower described a number of methods it uses such as
tips from citizens, reviews of plans, and quarterly reviews required under
grand contracts.11 4 However, the most striking information came from
what went unsaid. The letter made it clear that at this point CBLAD does
not have a long term strateg in place for assuring continued compliance
by the localities it oversees. ! With this in mind, recent discoveries about
the compliance practices in Portsmouth or elsewhere should come as no
surprise. Clower has described his own agency as "a paper tiger."'1 16 "It
111 See VA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, CHESAPEAKE BAY ACT INCORPORATED INTO
VIRGINIA'S COASTAL PROGRAM, available at http://www.deq.state.va.us/coastal (last

visited Dec. 1, 2001).
112 See Clower Letter, supra note 82.
113 Id.
114Id.
115 Revised regulations containing a requirement that each locality file an annual
implementation report are currently under consideration. See id.
116 Harper, supra note 91.
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lacks the authority to fine offenders, lacks the staff to study compliance
trends and must7 rely on citizen complaints to investigate problems,"
Clower added."
A.

CBLAD: UnderFunded and Under Resourced

When CBLAD was created it had a staff of twenty-eight people.' 18
During the 1990s the staff numbered as few as fifteen people and presently
includes twenty-one members. 19 Of the fifteen, only eight were field
compliance personnel. 120 They were responsible for monitoring the entire
eighty-four Tidewater localities that are covered by CBPA. 12' This lack of
staffing is one reason why Portsmouth was able get by without requiring
22
water quality assessments for so long. 1
Another key budgetary problem is funding for financial and
technical assistance to localities. With an annual budget of $500,000,
CBLAD does not have enough funding to maintain a positive and
proactive presence in the localities. This has been mentioned by local
level policy-makers as one reason CBLAD has lost credibility with the
localities. 123 No longer able to assist localities on compliance issues,
CBLAD is simply thought of as another enforcement agency to be dealt
with, and not an effective one at that.
In his letter to Treacy, Clower wrote that the "continued
compliance of local governments once their program has been approved
occurs through the Program's: review of local program amendments;
review of program implementation; and ability to initiate administrative
and legal proceedings and to seek the imposition of civil penalties or
charges. ' 124 However, at a November 18, 2000 "Save the Bay Breakfast"
sponsored by the CBF, Clower said that the lack of staff and funds has
meant that the Department is not able to take proactive measures to assure
compliance and instead can only react to problems that are brought to its
attention. 125 In order to be effective, Clower has stated that "[w]e need
117 Id.
118 See

Clower, supra note 78.

119 See id.
120 See
121

See

122 See
123
124
125

See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
Hinson Interview, supra note 100.
Clower Letter, supra note 82.
Clower, supra note 78.
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about 50% more people and almost double our budget .... But let's face
it . . . we're not exactly the most politically popular agency out there.
We're a 6 land-use program. And in Virginia, that's just not a popular
12
thing."'
B.

CBLAD Has Few Enforcement Options

CBLAD's hands are tied to a certain extent because it must deal
with the localities. It cannot deal directly with people found to be in
violation of the regulations, either through fines or injunctions. 127 The
reason for this is because granting CBLAD the authority to issue fines and
seek injunctions would create an overlapping enforcement system in
which developers and land owners would have to comply with the law as
it is interpreted and enforced by their local government and as it is
interpreted and enforced by CBLAD. This could put a tremendous burden
on citizens attempting to comply with the law in good faith. The only
thing CBLAD can do in the face of obvious and ongoing violations of the
28
CBPA is to convince the localities to actively enforce the rules.1
The Board's most persuasive tool is the threat of suit. The CBPA
authorizes the Board to sue localities in order to ensure future cooperation
and compliance. 129 The Attorney General acts as the Board's lawyer in
these instances and is responsible for filing the suit. By its own accounts,
CBLAD has used the threat of suit as an effective tool in the past,
however, recent events seem to indicate that this threat is no longer
considered credible.130 As described earlier, the Board has only sued
once, and while that court battle was generally successful, it was not the
kind of victory that would instill fear in the hearts of localities. The
localities understand that the Board is in a difficult spot. The standard it
must meet in court is a high one. The remedy for a verdict against a
locality is court ordered enforcement of the CBPA.' 3 ' For the Board to
win, it must prove not only that the locality has failed to enforce the Act in
32
the past, but also that the locality is refusing to comply in the future.'

126Harper,
127

See VA.

supra note 91.
CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2103-04 (Michie 1950 & Cur. Supp. 2000).

See id. § 2108.
129See id. § 2105.
128

130 See
131

132

Harper, supra note 91.

See Clower, supra note 78.
See id.

460

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol.26:441

This very difficult standard has
made CBLAD and the Attorney General
133
very weary of suing localities.
Generally, when CBLAD has voted to sue a locality and informed
the Attorney General, the localities have taken a very conciliatory tone and
promised to enforce the act in the future, avoiding legal action.1 34 If the
Attorney General were to press the suit, the locality could argue that it is
now working with CBLAD in good faith and there is no reason for the
suit.1 35 While renewed promises to enforce the CBPA may be considered
a victory for CBLAD, recent evidence of negligent enforcement, some of
which has been willful, indicates that localities do not believe the Board is
willing or able to follow through.
Finally, even if the Board were unfettered in its ability to sue noncompliant localities, the budget and staff requirements for mounting suits
would be prohibitive.136 Lawsuits are very time consuming and staff
consuming. The preparation of a case takes staff away from other roles
such as enforcement. CBLAD must think very carefully before it commits
its finite resources to such a venture.
VIII.

ROLE OF CITIZENS INENFORCEMENT

Perhaps the only saving grace the Board and CBLAD have is the
role citizens have played in enforcing the CBPA. In 1997, CBLAD
adopted a Standard Operating Procedure for handing citizens complaints
about the implementation of local programs.' 37 From August 1997
through June 1999, CBLAD responded to twenty-eight citizen
complaints. 38 In fact, it was a citizen complaint that alerted CBLAD to
Portsmouth's unwillingness to enforce the regulations. 139 Considering
CBLAD's small staff and meager resources, vigilant individuals and
groups like Save Our Buffers and the CBF play an extremely important
role in enforcement. Unfortunately, reporting incidents of non-compliance
by individuals or localities is as far as the citizen can go. The legislation

133 See id.
134
135

See id.
See id.

136

See id.

137

See Clower, supra note 78.

138

See id.
Harper, supra note 91.

139See
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provides no avenue by which proactive citizens can seek to punish
violations of the CBPA that the Board fails to address. 40
Citizens can play a role in enforcement through their legal standing
to contest zoning decisions that are in violation of the CBPA. However, in
practice this has little value because standing to contest these decisions 1is
41
limited to neighboring landowners (landowners adjacent to a parcel).
Few have the knowledge, financial resources, and motivation to follow
through with litigation on such an issue.
IX.

AMENDMENTS

Over the past six years, the Board has attempted. to amend the
regulations to close some of the loopholes that have come to light. 142 Two
of these amendments are particularly controversial. First, the Board would
like to restrict the ability of localities to grant exceptions allowing
development within the 100-foot buffer. 143 While the Board claims that
these amendments are simply clearing up confusion about the intent of its
prior regulations, they are in fact quite plainly aimed at localities that, in
the opinions of the Board, CBLAD, and environmental groups, have
purposefully exploited the exception provisions in order to encourage
development. This has caused quite a stir among some property owners,
real estate interests, developers, and local government officials who
believe these new regulations will erode property rights, deprive localities
of much needed flexibility in implementation, and make development
unnecessarily cumbersome and expensive. 144
There has also been significant resistance to amendments adding
criteria regarding the Board and CBLAD's process for reviewing local
program implementation for consistency with the regulations. Under one
of the proposed amendments, each Tidewater locality would have to
140 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2100-16 (Michie 1950 & Curn. Supp. 2000).
141 See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-496.1 (Michie Cum. Supp. 2000). Zoning appeals may be
taken by "aggrieved" parties. In Cupp. v. Board of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411-12
(Va. 1984), the court stated that "aggrieved" parties in zoning disputes must have a
"personal stake" in the outcome of the case and that the owner of affected property
always has "personal stake."
142 CHESAPEAKE BAY LOCAL ASSISTANCE DEP'T, SHORT SUMMARY OF PROPOSED

at http://www.cblad.state.va.us/pubs/regulations/shortsummaryofpropo
sedregulationamendments.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
143 See Scott Harper, Public Hearing Addresses Amendments to Bay Preservation Act,
VIRGINIAN PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Nov. 17, 2000, at B9, available at 2000 WL
23691666.
144 See id.
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submit an annual implementation report to the Board outlining the
implementation of the local program.' 45 This is opposed by many
localities that claim it will reuire
the needless expenditure of local funds
46
and staff time for preparation.
X.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

Adopt the ProposedRegulatory Revisions

While the localities make a compelling argument for retaining
flexibility with regard to the 100-foot buffer, the evidence suggesting that
this flexibility will be abused is simply too strong. The proposed
regulations make a small but important step forward. For too long,
CBLAD has not had an avenue by which to effectively monitor local
implementation. It is vitally important that CBLAD learn from the errors
uncovered in Portsmouth and reasserts at least a minimal level of control
over the localities. The proposed regulatory changes will give it the tools
it needs to do just that.
B.

Be Guided by Science
Although CBLAD used scientific data to formulate its 100 foot

buffer policy, 1 7 there is still a great deal of confusion and disagreement

about which methods are the most effective at reducing aggregate runoff
of nutrients into the Bay. To address this problem, the DEQ should
conduct an in-depth study of the effectiveness of various pollution
mitigation measures. Localities argue that mitigation measures such as
BMPs or river rehabilitation projects are just as beneficial as the buffers.
In truth there appears to be little hard evidence to turn to in comparing and
contrasting these methods with the buffer program. A comprehensive
study would allow CBLAD and the localities to set regulations secure in
the knowledge that the method or blend of methods they choose will have
the results they expect.
C.

Provide CBLAD with the FundingIt Needs to Do the Job

145

See Va. Reg. 9 VAC 10-20-250(1)-(3) (2001).

146

See Kathy James Webb, Remarks at Public Hearing on Regulatory Revisions (Nov.

17, 2000) (transcript available from CBLAD).
147 See Telephone Interview with Laura McKay, Virginia Coastal Program, Virginia
Dep't of Envtl. Quality (Oct. 5, 2000).
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The reductions in CBLAD's funding have made it more difficult
for CBLAD to act as a partner to localities. In the early years of the
program, CBLAD grants gave localities much needed help with planning
and implementation, making them more amenable to stick to enforcement
of the regulations. As CBLAD has been forced to become more of a strict
regulatory enforcement agency an atmosphere of skepticism and distrust
has filled the void. Until the Board and CBLAD can offer some sort of
carrot to go with the stick, this relationship will not be the kind of
cooperative partnership envisioned by the legislation.1 48 Furthermore, a
more capable CBLAD would be able to grant localities more flexibility,
secure in the knowledge that abuses would be detected.
D.

Expand Board's Authority to Enforce the CBPA Through Legal
Action

As currently constituted, the Board's authority to institute legal and
administrative actions to ensure compliance by local governing bodies is
little more than a hollow threat. Localities have little or no fear that they
may be held accountable in court. This only makes them bolder in their
defiance of the regulations. Another option is granting CBLAD the right
to institute legal or administrative action directly against developers or
property owners whose actions are flagrantly in violation of their local
ordinances. This would be a drastic measure and in order to minimize the
conflicts with local authorities it would be important that the standard of
review be heightened as in a criminal case.
XI.

A NEW DIRECTION FOR ENFORCEMENT

The recommendations above, if implemented, would help make the
CBPA a more effective statute. However, the problems that plague the
statute are rooted in its very core. Placing essentially unfettered
enforcement authority into the hands a large number of localities that vary
greatly from one another in terms of structure and resources almost
guarantees the types of problems that have been encountered. If Virginia
is truly committed to preserving the Bay for future generations to enjoy, it
must act decisively to centralize power and achieve some measure of
uniformity in the implementation of the CBPA. Though many in the
Commonwealth would loathe admitting it, the federal government might
have just the plan for doing this.
148

VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2100 (Michie 1950 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
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The FederalModel

The cooperative partnership scheme employed by the CBPA is not
dissimilar in structure from many federal environmental statutes. One of
the most common elements of the statutory scheme for federal
49
environmental statutes is the delegation of enforcement authority.
These federal statutes, which include, among others, the Clean Air Act
("CAA"), 150 the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),' 5 ' the Safe Drinking Water
Act,152 and the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"),153 allow the EPA to delegate enforcement authority to the
states on the condition that the state programs meet certain minimum
standards. 54 The state then operates its program in lieu of the federal
program. This is meant to utilize the state's increased understanding of
local conditions (as well as the state's resources) and the state's flexibility
to adopt creative approaches and solutions to environmental problems.155
This does not mean that the EPA has no role in enforcement. The
EPA supervises the states to ensure that their programs remain consistent
with federal standards, thereby creating some measure of national
consistency. 56 Furthermore, if for some reason a state fails to take action
in response to a violation of the law, or the state's reaction is inadequate,
the EPA retains the authority to institute its own enforcement actions
against the violator.' 57 When the EPA exercises this authority it is called
' 58
"overfiling."'
As a matter of policy, the EPA does not overfile when a state has
taken timely and appropriate action. 59 Its policy calls for overfiling if any
fines levied by the state are deemed inadequate, settlement conditions are
Lisa Dittman, Note, Overfiling: Policy Arguments in Support of the Gorilla
in the
Closet, 48 UCLA L. REv. 375, 376 (2000).
149

15042

U.S.C. §7413 (1994).

152

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(a)(1) (1994).

153

Id. § 6921.

151

155

Dittman, supra note 149.
See id. at 377.

156

See id.

154See

See id.
158

See id.

159

See id. at 380. See also Office of Solid Waste Mgmt. and Emergency Response, U.S.

Envtl. Protection Agency, OSWER Directive No. 9939.0, Guidance on RCRA Overfiling
2 (May 1986).

2001]

ADRIFT WITHOUT A PADDLE

465

insufficient to alleviate "imminent and substantial endangerment to health
or the environment," 160 the state failed to act after having been notified of
the problem, or simply that the EPA believes there are issues which still
must be corrected.16' While this type of discretion could open the door to
numerous interventions, this is somewhat misleading. In reality,
overfilings are "very rare for comity and resource reasons."' 62 A state-bystate survey conducted by the Environmental Council of the States for
1992 showed the number of cases declining from a high of three-tenths of
a percent in the early 1990s to less than one-tenth of one percent between
1995 and 1996.163 According to Tom Sitz, an attorney with EPA's Office
of Enforcement, Compliance, and164Environmental Justice for Region 8, the
downward trend continues today.
B.

The Legal Landscape

Over the last twenty-one years, a series of cases have addressed the
surrounding the practice of overfiling, providing significant
issues
legal
food for thought for policy makers and legislators considering the
usefulness of the federal model. Out of these cases have risen two
questions that must be answered before any discussion on the topic can
continue. The first question is what does the statute authorize? As one of
the cases in the line demonstrates, the EPA should ensure the legislation
actually authorizes overfiling before filing. The second question is
practice of overfiling might be barred by the principle of res
whether the
65
judicata.1
1.

What Does the Statue Authorize?

For many years, nobody questioned the source of the EPA's
authority to overfile, but that changed with the case of Harmon Industries,
Inc. v Browner.166 In analyzing whether the RCRA truly authorized
160 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-22(k) (1994).
161

See Dittman, supra note 149, at 380.

See id. (quoting e-mail from Josh Secunda, Senior Enforcement Counsel, Office of
Environmental Stewardship, EPA's New England Region, to author (Nov. 8, 1999) (on
162

file with author)).
163 See Harmon Defense Rejected in Second Lawsuit to Doubt Right of Overfiling,
HAZARDOUS WASTE SUPERFUND WK., Jan
164See id.
165
166

1. 2001.

See Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 902-04 (8th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 899-900.
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overfiling, the court focused on language in the statute stating that a state's
program operates "in lieu of' the federal government's hazardous waste
program,'16 and "[a]ny action taken by a State under a hazardous waste
program authorized under [the RCRA] [has] the same force and effect as
action taken by the [EPA] under this subchapter.' 68 The court interpreted
this language as a clear indication that once the EPA certified a state
program as meeting its standards, Congress intended for the EPA to cede
all enforcement authority growing out of the Act to the state, until such
time that the EPA rescinded that authority based upon a finding that:
(1) The state program is not equivalent to the federal
program;
(2) The state program is not consistent with federal or state
programs in other states; or
(3) The state program is failing to provide adequate
enforcement of compliance in accordance with the
requirements of federal law. 169
This strict reading of the language only allows the EPA to file against
individual violators in states in which the state government does not have
enforcement authority. The EPA's response to this interpretation was that
its overfiling authority was clearly laid out in section 6928 of the RCRA,
which states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), whenever on the
basis of any information the [EPA] determines that any
person has violated or is in violation of any requirement of
this subchapter, the [EPA] may issue an order assessing a
civil penalty for any past or current violation, requiring
compliance immediately or within a specified time period,
or both, or the [EPA] may commence a civil action in the
United States district court in the district in which the
violation occurred for appropriate relief, including a
temporary
or
permanent
injunction.
(2) In the case of a violation of any requirement of [the
RCRA] where such violation occurs in a State which is
authorized to carry out a hazardous waste program under

168

See 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (2000).
Id. § 6926(d).

169

See id. § 6926(b).

167
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section 6926 of this title, the [EPA] shall give notice to the
State in which such violation has occurred prior to issuing
an order or commencing a civil action under this section.
The EPA interpreted this language as allowing it to initiate action
against an alleged violator within an authorized state as long as it first
notified the state in writing.' 7 1 The court dismissed this interpretation,72
of the state.
stating that it undermined the primary enforcement role
Instead, the court said that sections 6928(a)(1) and (2) should be read
within the framework of the entire Act, and when interpreted within this
context the language manifests Congress' intent to give the EPA a
be exercised if the state had failed to
secondary enforcement right, to
173
action.
enforcement
any
initiate
The lesson for the prospective drafters of the new enforcement
provisions is quite simple: be specific. The ambiguous language of the
RCRA allowed the court the find an interpretation that was consistent with
its stance that overfiling is not good policy. Any legislation drafted to
authorize overfiling must be clear on where the authorities of the state and
the localities begin and end, respectively. This means specifically
defining the circumstances under which the CBPA might overfile a
locality.
Is Overfiling Barred by Res Judicata?

2.

The common law doctrine of res judicata dictates that a "final
judgment on the merits of a claim precludes the parties from further
litigation based on that claim. The doctrine protects litigants from
multiple law suits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters certainty and
reliance in legal relationships."' 174 As currently written, the CBPA allows
localities to use fines and other penalties to penalize violations of
ordinances relating to the Act. 175 If a scheme following the federal model
were to be adopted, violators would undoubtedly have occasion to raise
res judicata as a defense, claiming that CBLAD's claims have been
170 !d. §§ 6928(a)(l)-(2)
171 See Harmon, 191 F.3d at 899.
172

See id.

173 See
174

id.

State Water Control Bd. v. Snithfield Food, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Va. 2001)

(quoting Bill Greever Corp. v. Tazewell Nat'l Bank, 256 Va. 250, 254 (1998)).
175 VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2109 (Michie 1950 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
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precluded by local enforcement actions. The following cases help flesh
out when this defense might be successful.
a.

United States v. ITT Rayonier,Inc.

The question of whether overfiling might be in conflict with the
principle of res judicata was first explored by the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. ITTRayonier, Inc. 176 In its deliberations, the court noted that res
judicata may not be applicable when there are countervailing statutory
policies that would be thwarted. However, the court rejected this
argument in the context of overfiling, stating it could "not perceive how
the need for uniformity under [the CWA] is best promoted by conflicting
judicial constructions and repeated agency prosecutions."' 7 7 While this
direct condemnation of the practice has not been widely repeated, there
does seem to be a consensus supporting the court's finding that overfiling
does not abrogate res judicata on policy grounds.
In its holding, the court declared that while the CWA expressly
authorized the EPA to overfile, the principle of res judicata precluded the
EPA from beginning any enforcement action after the state enforcement
action had reached a final judgment. Prior to a final judgment on a state
action, the EPA could still bring its own enforcement action in federal
176

627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980) (deciding whether a judgment by the
Washington

Supreme Court in a state enforcement action precluded an EPA enforcement action that
was still on going).
177 Id. at 100 1-02. Regarding abrogation, the
court stated:
In employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., several circuits have refused to
give collateral estoppel effect to prior decisions by state agencies under
state law. See, e.g., Batiste v. Fumco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1127, 43 L.Ed.2d
399 (1975); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972);
Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 894 (2nd Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918, 92 S.Ct. 1768, 32 L.Ed.2d 117 (1972). See
also, Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th
Cir. 1980) (refusing to accord collateral estoppel effect to prior state
court determination). But see, Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983, 100 S.Ct. 488, 62 L.Ed.2d 411
(1979) (Title VII suit barred when issues decided adversely to plaintiff
in prior state proceeding). These courts have found a countervailing
public policy that a plaintiff is not to be deprived of a federal forum to
adjudicate employment discrimination claims. Unlike Title VII,
FWPCA does not provide a mandatory period of deference to state
proceedings.
Id. at 1002.
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court, but once a final judgment had been reached, the EPA's only option
was to withdraw the state's enforcement authority. 7 8 Of course, the
preclusive effect of res judicata cuts both ways. In ITT Rayonier, if the
EPA had pressed its case and arrived at final judgment before the state, the
state case would have been barred under the same principles.
b.

Harmon Industries,Inc. v Browner

In Harmon, the Eighth Circuit considered whether a state court
consent decree barred an EPA enforcement action under the principles of
res judicata. 179 The Harmon court's analysis began with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause found in the United States Constitution, which
"require[s] federal courts to give preclusive effect to the judgments of
state courts whenever the state court from which the judgment emerged
would give such ari effect."' 180 This required that the court analyze
whether Missouri law would extend protections of res judicata to a
consent decree. 18 1 This holding sent a signal that the war over whether res
judicata precludes overfiling would be fought in small battles, with
different remedies being tested against different states' concepts of res
judicata.
c.

CLEAN v. PSF

In Citizens Legal EnvironmentalAction Network, Inc. (CLEAN) v.
Premium Standard Farms, Inc. (PSF),18 2 the court considered, in part,
whether claims brought in a citizen suit filed by CLEAN under the
authority of the CWA and the CAA were precluded by a state enforcement
action on the grounds that the claims were the same. The CLEAN court
analyzed this issue by comparing the counts of the claims side-by-side to
see if they were truly identical. 83 This case is important because it
Under many environmental
highlights a very plausible scenario.
a separate offense.' 8 4
considered
is
violation
of
day
each
laws
protection
See id. at 1002.
Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894,902 (8th Cir. 1999).
180 Id.
181 See id.
182
No. 97-6073-CV-SJ-6, 2000 WL 220464 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2000).
183 2000 WL 220464 at *5-7.
184 See Jerry Organ, Environmental Federalism Part II: The Impact of Harmon,
178

179

Smithfield, and CLEAN on Overfiling under RCRA, the CWA, and the CAA, 30 E.L.R.
10732, 10752 (2000).
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Consequently it is possible if not likely that a state's complaint will not
cover every conceivable violation, leaving the door open for others to
assert claims that would not be barred by res judicata because they are
85
different claims.1
d.

State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods

In State Water Control Board v. Smithfield Foods 86 the Virginia
Supreme Court considered Smithfield's contention that an enforcement
action brought by the State Water Control Board was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because Smithfield had already been found liable
for violations of its permit in an action brought by the EPA. 187 In
Virginia, to establish a defense of res judicata the proponent must
demonstrate the "identity of the remedies sought, identity of the cause of
action, identity of parties, and identity of the quality of the persons for or
188
against whom the claim is made."'
By an agreement between the parties made before the trial court,
189
the only question at issue in this case was the identity of the parties.
Though the Board was not a party to the prior action, the Virginia
Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of privity extends the preclusive
effect of a prior judgment to any potential party that was in privity with a
party in the prior proceeding.19° While there is no fixed definition of
privity with regard to res judicata, the key to the concept for purposes of
res judicata is that the interests of the parties are so identical in terms of
the legal right being represented. In the case at hand, the court considered
whether the interests of the EPA and those of the Board were so identical
that the legal right represented by the EPA in its prior action was the same
9
as the Board sought to assert in the present action.' '
The Smithfield court recognized that the Board and the EPA drew
their enforcement authority from different sources (the Board from
Virginia statutes, the EPA from the CWA). The salient fact in the eyes of
185

See id.

186

542 S.E.2d 766 (Va. 2001).

187

See id.

188

See id. at 769.

189See

id. The court made a point of noting that it distinguishes between the identity of

the legal interests advanced and the identity of the cause of action. It is only because the
parties agreed to limit the issues that the court did not address this issue in its opinion.
See id.
190 Smith v. Ware, 421 S.E.2d 444 (Va. 1992).
191 Smithfield Foods, 542 S.E.2d at 769.
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the court, however, was that the permit issued to Smithfield represented
the interests of both authorities.' 92 This permit indicated that they
"share[d] more than an abstract interest in enforcement."' 93 With this in
mind, the court held that the state and the EPA were indeed in privity and
the Board's case was therefore precluded by res j udicata.194
e.

Lessons Learned

The cases discussed above highlight some important aspects of the
legal landscape surrounding res judicata and the practice of overfiling. It
is clear that if the Virginia legislature where to adopt the federal model of
enforcement for the CBPA, CBLAD's ability to overfile would have some
limitations. Yet, it also seems clear that these limitations are manageable.
As long as CBLAD diligently assessed the facts of each individual
situation before filing it ought to be able to identify problems of privity
and identity of claims and predict when claims are likely to be precluded.
There does not appear to be a legal barrier proscribing the federal model
as a viable alternative to the current system.
4.

Problems With Overfiling

The process is not without its flaws or its critics. The EPA's
exercise of its overfiling authority usually indicates a rift between the EPA
and the state over some technical or philosophical issue relating to the
enforcement, and if there was not one before the EPA overfiles, it is bound
to create one. The fallout from this type of rift lands squarely on the
regulated community, which can be caught in the middle of this regulatory
tug-of-war not knowing with whom to deal with. In Harmon,'95 the Eight
Circuit commented that it is unreasonable to subject an alleged violator to
two separate enforcement actions that might reach contradictory results.
"Such a potential schism runs afoul of the principals of comity and
federalism so clearly embedded in the text and history of the RCRA."' 196 It
might also run afoul of the cooperative enforcement partnership created by
the CBPA. Overly aggressive use of overfiling authority by CBLAD
See id. at 770.
193See id. (quoting United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627
F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir.
1980)).
194 See id. at 771.
192

195191 F.3d 894
196 Id. at 902.

(8th Cir. 1999).
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could create a great deal of tension in its relationships with localities,
making it less likely that localities would take advantage of other services
provided by CBLAD under the authority of the CBPA, such as technical
advice.
The Harmon court also stated its belief that the overlapping
enforcement powers of an overfiling scheme "would predictably result in
confusion, inefficiency, duplicative agency expenditures and would thwart
the public policy of early and non-judicial dispute resolution."' 97 If this
prediction were correct, amending the CBPA to follow the federal model
could create problems which might offset the benefits of innovative
thinking and local knowledge that the cooperative partnership was
designed to tap.
Finally, the lessons found in the case history on this topic could
create some troubling incentives on both sides of the equation. The final
judgment standard outlined in ITT Rayonier creates a race to final
judgment that could be very destructive. Concern over the possibility of
losing the option of suit could cause the EPA to pursue claims without
much forethought in order to avoid preclusion. On the other side, counsel
attempting to forestall EPA overfilings may be best served by encouraging
local enforcement officers to "throw the book at them" and charge them
with everything possible so that there are no new claims available. This
type of illogical incentive only limits the willingness and ability of local
officials to utilize their flexibility in finding innovative methods of solving
problems.
5.

The Benefits of Overfiling

It is important to remember that the CBPA places enforcement
mechanisms in the hands of the localities to take advantage of their local
knowledge and flexibility and to make compliance easier for effected
landowners. However, the legislature did not intend for the localities to
develop their own Bay protection schemes independent of the Act. It is
certainly reasonable that CBLAB and CBLAD expect the localities to
administer and enforce CBPA related ordinances in a manner consistent
with other localities and with the law itself. Overfiling would allow it to
enforce this consistency. It would also benefit the regulated population by
limiting confusion caused by dissimilarities between the individual
programs administered by eighty-four different localities. This type of
consistency would be especially beneficial to businesspersons such as
197 See id.
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developers, contractors, and homebuilders whose businesses span several
different localities, necessitating the spending of time and money to learn
the ins and outs of multiple administrative mechanisms.
An additional benefit of overfiling is that it provides a mechanism
by which localities and regulated persons or entities can be effectively
educated as to how the law is properly interpreted and applied. One of the
major complaints of CBLAD and people in the environmental community
is that the language of the CBPA is very gray, allowing localities to adopt
interpretations very much at odds with CBLAD's interpretation and the
original intent of the legislature. Although the pending amendments to the
CBPA attempt to eliminate some of this gray language, it would seem
unlikely that CBLAD and the localities in question would agree to
changes in the enforcement scheme as long as there is a financial incentive
for localities to find justifications for lax enforcement. Examples like
Portsmouth indicate that competition for development dollars may be
spurring a race to the bottom among localities as they try to promote
themselves as development friendly. The specter of having CBLAD
overfile would provide localities with a real incentive make sure their
programs reflect the goals and policies of the CBPA and to make sure
those goals and policies are98 the foremost consideration when
administering related ordinances.'
The localities themselves might also benefit from a revised
enforcement scheme. Under the current scheme, when serious violators
are uncovered, it's the locality that must face the music. CBLAD cannot
address the situation directly with the violator so they must go after the
locality. These problems almost never make it to court but they do require
significant time and effort on the part of their staffs, which translates into
money wasted on infighting. The federal model allows CBLAD to bypass
the locality and deal directly with the violator, which in some instances
may save the locality a tremendous amount of money. Also, the localities
can use the threat of CBLAD intervention, and even the race to judgment
created by ITT Rayonier, as sources of leverage in their negotiations with
violators.
Finally, the complaints of those who oppose overfiling are the
same complaints that have been voiced since the inception of the concept,
and there is little evidence to suggest that any of these dire predictions
have come to pass. As was mentioned above, very few overfilings
actually take place and those that do, occur only after the EPA has given
This is not to say that all or most of the localities do not attempt to enforce the CBPA
in good faith. It is quite clear that many if not most of the effected localities have worked
198

hard to meet or surpass CBLAD's expectations.
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significant warning to all parties that action is on the horizon if their
conduct is not altered. Given CBLAD's unwillingness to pull the trigger
on suits against localities, it is unlikely that it would exercise its overfiling
authority unless it was the only viable option. The fact the CBLAD has
only once taken a locality to court indicates that it has consistently erred
on the side of caution and accommodation in its dealings with the
localities. CBLAD can be counted on to act responsible in the use of this
authority. If only those regulated by the CBPA were as reasonable, there
would be no need for this discussion.
6.

Citizen Suits

Besides allowing overfiling, the federal model differs from the
scheme laid out in the CBPA in that it makes provision for citizen suits.
This is a concept that has generated a great deal of discussion and
controversy on the federal level. Over the last twenty years the Supreme
Court has gradually moved to limit the citizen suit by making it more
difficult to gain standing. 199 Today, in federal court the plaintiff has the
burden of providing evidence to prove standing. 200 This evidence is
evaluated using a three-part test for Article III standing. The evidence
must show the plaintiff has standing because there is "injury in fact,
However,
adequate causation, and a likelihood of redressability.' '2°
the
legislature
If
matter.
different
is
a
Virginia
gaining standing within
chose to adopt a citizen suit provision it would be within its power to
abrogate normal limitations on standing and create an entirely new
structure.
A well thought out citizen suit provision could be an excellent
enforcement provision in this situation. It is important that citizen suits be
considered in the proper context. They are meant to be a tool for
enforcement, not a penalty. The EPA, CBLAD, and the localities are in
similar positions. They are charged with enforcing environmental
provisions across areas far too large to effectively patrol no matter how
many local officials are co-opted into enforcement. The incident in
Portsmouth is the perfect example. Until Save Our Buffers invited
CBLAD to inspect certain pieces of property, CBLAD was completely
unaware that Portsmouth had ceased requiring developers to comply with
199

See Martin A. McCrory, Standing in the Ever-Changing Stream: The Clean Water

Act, Article III Standing, and Post-ComplianceAdjudication, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 73,

96-105 (2001).

200 See id. at 105.
201 See id.
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the 100-foot buffers. 20 2 Since that notification CBLAD and Portsmouth
have entered into negotiations to bring the city into compliance.20 3
Many property rights advocates and government officials have
expressed concern that citizen suit provisions would flood the courts with
frivolous suits, forcing individuals and localities to bankrupt themselves
with legal bills. However, there is little evidence to suggest that legalizing
such suits would open the floodgates.
There are several steps that could be taken in order to limit the
number and kinds of citizen suits filed. First, the legislature could adopt
very specific restrictions on standing, limiting it to persons who own
adjacent property or those living nearby who can prove damages. 2°
Second, the legislature could craft a restrictive notice requirement to
ensure that the locality had ample opportunity to investigate the situation
and preempt the suit with its own enforcement action if it so chooses.20 5
Third, the legislature could strictly limit the remedies available to ensure
that people are not motivated by greed. These restrictions, in combination
with existing barriers such as the high cost of litigation, would eliminate
many of the suits that worry opponents without nullifying the value of the
citizen suits as an enforcement tool.
XI.

CONCLUSION

In a January 9, 2000 article, the Virginian-Pilot & Ledger-Star
described the CBPA as having "revolutionized land-use management in
eastern Virginia by putting it under state oversight more than 10 years
ago. ,,206 While this may be so, it would appear that since then the
revolution has stagnated. The momentum begun by the signing of the
Chesapeake Bay Agreement and sustained by the passage of the CBPA
has now faded and the difficulties of reversing years of careless
exploitation of the Bay are now coming into focus. This has left the
Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act at a crossroads. If all of the interested
parties can work together to correct the enumerated deficiencies the CBPA
can become the dynamic, proactive, and cooperative program it was
envisioned to be. If, however, the legislature does not act soon to change
202 See Harper,supra note 91.

203 See Clower Interview, supra note 97.
204 See McCrory, supra note 199, at 90-92. The CWA requires sixty days notice before
filing. See id.

205 See id.
206 Virginia Briefs, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Jan. 9, 2000, at

2001 WL 9707136.

B3, availableat
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the Act's enforcement .scheme and provide the Board and CBLAD with
the proper support, over time the CBPA will become increasingly hollow
and insignificant.

